Introduction
The international movement in favour of criminal sanctions for 'serious' cartel conduct over the last decade has been well-documented. 1 In 2009, Australia will become the latest convert in the campaign led by the United States over the last decade to have this type of anti-competitive activity seen and dealt with as a crime. 2 Australia's conversion may be taken as further evidence of 'common ground' if not convergence in both substantive antitrust law and enforcement strategy with respect to cartel conduct. However, it should be seen as commonality or convergence at the highest level of generality or abstraction only. 3 As described in this paper, the Australian experience supports equally the view that the approach taken by a particular country in deciding whether to criminalize and, if so, how to define and enforce a cartel offence is likely to be distinctive in various respects. There will be multiple complex forces at work in such matters. A full appreciation of their influence and interaction will transcend orthodox legal and economic analysis and require insight from at least the disciplines of political science, sociology, regulation, organizational behaviour, psychology and history.
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This paper does not attempt to map exhaustively the various factors or actors that have influenced the Australian criminalization project to date. 4 Instead it focuses on three particular aspects or issues that have marked the process over the last eight years:
• political prevarication and compromise (see section 3);
• legislative overreach and complexity (see section 4); and
• enforcement bifurcation and excessive discretion (see section 5).
It is not asserted that any or all of these facets are unique to the Australian experience or that they will not feature to the same extent in criminalization debates in other jurisdictions. However, an understanding of each and their interplay are central to understanding both the process by which the decision to criminalize was made in
Australia and also the outcome of that process in terms of the statutory scheme and enforcement policy that have been established. Going forward, these factors will continue to be influential in the implementation of the new cartel regime and in determining whether it delivers on the promise of greater deterrence of serious cartel conduct in the Australian economy.
5
It is concluded that Australia's decision to criminalize serious cartel conduct may prove infectious, at least to some countries that are geographically, economically, socially and legally proximate to Australia. However, those countries may be advised to approach criminalization in such a way that vaccinates them from the pathology infecting Australia's new criminal cartel regime. 6 A degree of immunity may be secured by ensuring that definitional and enforcement issues are examined in detail early on, 4 That 'mapping' is being undertaken by the author as part of a large research project on cartel criminalization funded over three years by the Australian Research Council. The project website is at http://www.cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au.
Australia.
14 It has been a contravention either to make a contract, arrangement or understanding containing such a provision or to give effect to such a provision contained in a contract, arrangement or understanding.
15
The amendments brought about by the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and
Other Measures) Bill 2008 (CC & OM Bill) will establish a new Division in the TP Act specific to cartels. 16 It will contain both cartel offences and a new set of parallel civil per se prohibitions. The general provisions of s 45 will remain, although the per se prohibition on price fixing will be removed as this will be the subject of one of the new per se prohibitions.
The new offences and civil per se prohibitions will reflect the 1998 Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's Recommendation of the Council concerning
Effective Action against Hard-Core Cartels in that they will be addressed to four types of provision, broadly categorised as involving price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging. 17 These types of provisions are to be classified as 'cartel provisions'. 18 Once the 2009 Bill is passed, it will be an offence (subject to proof of the fault elements referred to below) or a civil per se violation to make a contract, arrangement or understanding that contains a cartel provision or to give effect to a cartel provision contained in a contract, arrangement or understanding. 19 The only difference in the elements of the offences and the civil prohibitions is that the former will require the proof of certain mental (fault) elements generally associated with criminal provisions, namely the intention to make a contract or arrangement or arrive at an understanding, or to give effect to a cartel provision with the knowledge or belief that the cartel provision is contained in a contract, arrangement or understanding.
20 14 See TP Act, ss 45(2)(a)(ii), 45(2)(b)(ii). 15 See s 45(2)(a) for the making prohibition and s 45(2)(b) for the giving effect prohibition. 'Give effect to' in relation to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding is defined broadly to include to 'do an act or thing in pursuance of or in accordance with or enforce or purport to enforce' (see TP Act, s 4(1)). 16 Part IV Div 1, that being the Part of the TP Act that contains the core prohibitions on anti-competitive conduct. Part IV Div 2 will contain s 45 and the other prohibitions on mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power and vertical restraints in ss 46-50. 17 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/FINAL (14 May 1998) 3, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf, last viewed 29 May 2009. 18 As defined in proposed TP Act, s 44ZZRD. 19 Despite the fact that the amendments will not be retrospective, there is no temporal limitation on the idea of giving effect in this context (see the definition referred to in n 15 above). Conceivably therefore it could catch conduct that gives effect to an agreement reached in the distant past. 20 Under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) an offence consists of physical elements and fault (mental) elements. The physical elements of the cartel offences are respectively: the making of a DRAFT 090609
There is a range of exceptions, exemptions and defences that will apply to conduct that otherwise would be subject to the new statutory prohibitions, criminal and civil. 21 Exemption or immunity may be obtained for provisions in contracts, arrangements or understandings on a case-by-case basis through the long-standing authorization or notification processes in Pt VII of the TP Act. 22 Notification in this context is available only for collective bargaining and then only for contracts where it is expected that the total value of the transactions under the contract over a 12-month period will not exceed AU$3 million (or higher amounts as set by regulations). 23 In addition, pre-existing exemptions from the per se prohibition on price fixing will continue for provisions in relation to the price of goods or services to be collectively acquired or for the joint advertising of the price for the re-supply of goods or services collectively acquired.
24
Exemptions also aim to prevent overlap between the various prohibitions under the TP Act. For example, if there is an agreement that involves a vertical exclusive dealing or resale price maintenance provision, then there are exemptions that remove it from the per se compass of the cartel prohibitions and allow it to be dealt with under the prohibitions specific to such restraints. 25 The same applies to provisions for the purchase of shares or assets which are to be dealt with under the general merger and acquisition prohibition under s 50.
26
The main exception to the cartel offences and new civil prohibitions will be for joint venture activity. This exception will be confined to contracts that relate to the joint production and supply of goods or services. 27 By contrast, the exception for the existing civil prohibition on exclusionary provisions is for contracts, arrangements and contract or arrangement or arriving at an understanding that contains a cartel provision (for the offence in s 44ZZRF); or the giving effect to a cartel provision contained in a contract, arrangement or understanding (for the offence in s 44ZZRG). The fault elements of the cartel offences are both implied as a result of the operation of the Criminal Code (intention) as well as expressly indicated in the offence provisions themselves (knowledge or belief). 21 See proposed TP Act, Pt IV Div 1 sub-Div D. 22 See the exceptions for conduct notified and cartel provisions subject to a grant of authorization in proposed TP Act, ss 44ZZRL-44ZZRM. 23 See TP Act, ss 93AB-93A. The collective bargaining notification procedure was introduced in 2007 as a concession to small business, in accordance with a recommendation by an independent review committee in 24 See proposed TP Act, s 44ZZRV. 25 See proposed TP Act, ss 44ZZRR-44ZZRS. 26 See proposed TP Act, s 44ZZRU. 27 See proposed TP Act, ss 44ZZRO-44ZZRP. A person will not be entitled to rely on the defence in relation to the cartel offences unless they have given the prosecutor certain information within 28 days after the day of committal for trial (see proposed s 44ZZRO(2)).
understandings for the purpose of a joint venture that do not have the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition. 28 The rationale for not including the issue of competitive effects in the exception for the cartel offences appears to have been that juries should not have to cope with an analysis of effects on competition.
29
A dual criminal/civil regime with wide ranging offences and prohibitions and substantial overlap between them means that policy and enforcement outcomes will depend on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by enforcement agencies. Those agencies are the body responsible for the enforcement of the TP Act, the ACCC, and the general centralized prosecutions agency that has responsibility for prosecutions of all indictable federal offences in Australia, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).
30
The roles of and relationship between these agencies in the context of the new cartel regime have been outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding (ACCC/DPP MOU).
31
As set out in the ACCC/DPP MOU, the ACCC is responsible for investigating cartel conduct and gathering evidence, managing the immunity process in consultation with the DPP, and referring serious cartel conduct to the DPP for consideration for prosecution.
32
The DPP is responsible for prosecuting the cartel offences in accordance with the DPP's Both corporations and individuals may be liable for cartel offences under the TP Act.
Individuals may be liable either as primary offenders or as accessories to an offence committed by a corporation. 37 For corporations, upon conviction, the maximum fine is the same as applies for a civil contravention, that is, the greatest of AU$10 million; three times the total value of benefits reasonably attributable to the offence; or if the total value of benefits is unascertainable, 10 per cent of the corporation's annual turnover over a 12-month period ending at the end of the month in which the corporation committed or began committing the offence. 38 For individuals, conviction for a cartel offence exposes them to a maximum fine of AU$220,000 and/or a maximum term of 10 years' imprisonment. 39 A range of other orders may be made, the most significant of which from an individual's perspective is the possibility of a disqualification order.
40
Provision has been made for bars on proceedings and use of evidence to deal with double 34 See TP Act, s 155. 35 See TP Act, Pt XID. 36 M Bezzi, 'The conduct of cartel litigation: The ACCC enforcement perspective on serious cartels -some key issues and practical considerations' (Paper presented at the Competition Law Conference, Sydney, 23 May 2009) 6. 37 As the TP Act is a Commonwealth law that regulates corporations in accordance with the Commonwealth's constitutional powers, primary liability for contraventions of the Act rests with corporations. For the purposes of this liability, the conduct and mental state of directors, employees or agents is imputed to the corporation provided they were acting within actual or ostensible authority. Individuals or non-corporate entities such as unincorporated associations or partnerships may attract primary liability under the application legislation of the States and Territories (the Competition Code) if they breach any of the prohibitions in that legislation. However, individuals may also attract ancillary (accessorial) liability in relation to the conduct of the corporation of which they are a director, employee or agent. Ancillary liability arises, for example, where an individual aids, abets, induces or is knowingly concerned in contravening conduct. The standard for such liability is knowledge of the essential facts. 38 See proposed TP Act, ss 44ZZRF(3), 44ZZRG(3). However, there are subtle differences between the penalty provisions that apply to the civil prohibitions under s 45 and those that apply to the new offences and civil per se prohibitions in Division 1. The effects of the differences between these appear to be that for the new prohibitions the court can calculate the maximum by summing the benefits obtained by all or any of the participants in the cartel and "obtaining" of a benefit includes obtaining it for another person or inducing a third person to do something that results in another person obtaining it (s 44ZZRG). By contrast, for the s 45 provisions, the maximum is to be calculated by reference only to the value of the benefit obtained by the body corporate (or any of its related body corporate) that contravened the provision. This difference is controversial. It is not clear why the more extensive approach to penalty assessment should apply to the new cartel offences and new civil penalty prohibitions but not the existing civil penalty prohibitions in s 45. 39 See proposed TP Act, s 79. 40 See TP Act, s 86E (and proposed s 44ZZRI). 45 In a further significant development associated with Australia's criminalization of serious cartel conduct, jurisdiction to deal with indictable criminal offences is to be conferred upon the Federal Court for the first time to enable it to hear cartel trials. 46 As indictable offences, the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial will apply, 47 and unanimous verdicts based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt will be necessary for conviction.
Political prevarication and compromise
Since at least the mid-1990s, competition policy in broad terms has enjoyed bipartisan support in Australia, as well as support at both the Commonwealth (federal) and State and 41 See proposed TP Act, s 76B which will impose a bar on civil proceedings for a pecuniary penalty order if a conviction is obtained in a criminal proceeding under the new cartel offences. Civil proceedings for a pecuniary penalty order will be stayed once criminal proceedings are started or where they have been started already under the cartel offences. If the person is not convicted, the civil proceedings may be resumed but otherwise they are dismissed. Further, criminal proceedings under the new cartel offences may be started regardless of whether a pecuniary penalty order in a civil proceeding has been made. These provisions do not limit the commencement of private enforcement actions. Evidence of information given or documents produced by an individual is not admissible in criminal proceedings against the individual if the individual gave the information or produced the documents in proceedings for a pecuniary penalty order against the individual (whether or not the order was made). 42 69 However, it was evident that the government in effect was pipelining the various trade practices reform packages then under consideration, using the promised cartel crime bill as leverage in negotiation with parliamentarians who were standing in the way of its other reforms, relating primarily to merger review processes and predatory pricing provisions. 70 In particular, around this time, publicity was given to significant penalties for price fixing in the airconditioning industry, a global airline cargo cartel in which the national carrier Qantas has been implicated and the announcement of an ACCC investigation into price fixing in stevedoring operations on Australian wharves. See M Drummond, '$9.2m punishment for air-con cartel', Australian Financial Review (2007) 244 ALR 673. A penalty of AU$36,000,000 was imposed on the corporate respondents (the previous maximum having been AU$15,000,000) and penalties of AU$1,500,000 and AU$500,000 on two individual respondents (the previous maximum having been AU$200,000).
donor and Visy Chairman, Richard Pratt. 72 In the media frenzy that accompanied the announcement of the settlement and Pratt's public apology, the then Prime Minister John
Howard praised the Visy Chairman for his contributions to Australian business and society and not coincidentally, it may seem, at the same time declined to re-commit the government to criminalization.
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The then Labor opposition seized the opportunity to voice its public support for criminalization, promising if elected to introduce criminal penalties in its first year in office. 74 Upon election, consistent with a general commitment to renewing competition policy in Australia, the Labor government appointed the country's first Minister for
Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs -Christopher Bowen. 75 With the change from a conservative to a Labor government came a change in the approach taken to the development of the criminalizing legislation. While remaining inherently political and hence imperfect from the standpoint of principle or policy, there was a clear shift from an approach marked by ambivalence and prevarication to one marked by consultation and compromise.
Bowen is a youthful, ambitious and hard-working politician and, in keeping with his party's election promise, released an Exposure Draft Bill of the criminalizing legislation, together with a discussion paper and a draft of the ACCC/DPP MOU, in January 2008.
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In particular, he sought submissions on the questions as to whether dishonesty should be an element of the new offence and whether the ACCC should have telecommunications interception powers. 77 The submissions on both questions were divided, 78 but also raised 72 Although, controversially, the ACCC did not seek a penalty personally against Pratt. a host of other complex legal and practical issues relevant to the design and enforcement of the proposed legislation. 79 So began a torturous and protracted process of consultation and revision, the results of which are yet to be finalized more than 18 months later.
In October 2008 Bowen released a second Exposure Draft Bill. 80 Dishonesty had been removed, it having been conceded that the dishonesty element would be problematic from an enforcement perspective. 81 The ACCC would have telecommunications interception powers, and in a further sign that the Labor government was seeking to remove any doubt about its criminalization credentials, the proposed maximum jail term had been lifted from five to 10 years. Australia was thus to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in this regard with the world's leading criminal cartel-buster, the United States. many of the issues highlighted in the first round of consultations had not been addressed.
In particular, the much-criticized breadth of the proposed cartel offences and their mirror civil prohibitions was not off-set by important exceptions and defences that would insulate vertical conduct from per se liability under the cartel prohibitions, as well as protect legitimate and often pro-competitive joint venture activity. 83 Moreover, concerns remained as to how the involvement of the DPP would affect the operation of the ACCC Immunity Policy, another issue highlighted early in the year but on which there had been no further announcement. 84 Yet more consultations were embarked upon. 85 into Parliament. 86 The Bill reinstated the so-called 'anti-overlap' exemption for vertical conduct that had been missing from the Exposure Drafts. At the same time, a revised MOU between the ACCC and DPP was released and adjustments made to both the ACCC's Immunity Policy and the DPP's Prosecution Policy to address the immunity issue. 87 Even so, the critics would not be silenced.
The Bill was referred to a Senate Economics Committee that received submissions and held a public hearing. In this process two issues dominated. 88 The first was whether the proposed scheme differentiated adequately between conduct warranting criminal treatment and conduct to be treated as a civil contravention, and the related question as to whether so much faith should be placed in the ACCC and DPP to draw this distinction in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 89 The second was whether the proposed joint venture exception was too narrowly drawn -in particular, whether it should not be confined to contracts and whether it should not be limited to contracts for joint supply or production.
90
The Committee was not persuaded that either of these issues necessitated amendments to the Bill and recommended that it be passed unamended. 91 However, it did recommend that the ACCC prepare guidelines to ameliorate uncertainty about the approach that will be taken to enforcement of the dual criminal/civil regime. 92 The result is that business activity that is either benign or indeed may even be procompetitive or otherwise welfare-enhancing may be 'chilled' by the very law that is intended to promote competition in the Australian economy.
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However, it is important to appreciate that these complaints are not novel in the context of Australian competition law, even if they are heightened in the context of the introduction of a criminal regime. In fact, the criticisms are best understood as criticisms that may be made more generally of two entrenched and distinctive features of the approach taken to competition legislation in this country. The first feature relates to the substance of the law and the second to the style of its drafting.
Legislative substance
In terms of the substance of the law, there is a history of formulating prohibitions for the TP Act that are over-inclusive in their terms and/or attach per se liability in circumstances in which it is arguably not warranted. In the cartel context, this is no more true than of the per se prohibition on exclusionary provisions in s 45, referred to above. 101 Paraphrasing, an exclusionary provision is defined as a provision that has the purpose of preventing or limiting dealings with third parties. 102 The essential flaw in this formulation is that it imposes a per se ban on conduct that is not necessarily anti-competitive or without any redeeming economic or social virtue in the sense generally assumed to attract strict liability in antitrust law. 103 Not surprisingly, the application of the prohibition has generated some strange results, most notably in the context of assessing whether it should DRAFT 090609 province of the statutory prohibitions enforced by the courts, whereas more general efficiency assessments are the domain of the administrative agencies empowered to exempt conduct from the prohibitions under a procedure of authorization.
110 This is not to say that the courts have not sought to introduce efficiency analysis into the interpretation of the prohibitions, albeit with results that have generated more uncertainty than clarity. 111 Moreover, the availability of authorization has not been seen as a satisfactory response to the overreach of the per se prohibition on exclusionary provisions. 112 As a matter of principle, it has been argued, legitimate business conduct should not be subject to a procedure that requires parties to demonstrate public benefits when the conduct may not be even anti-competitive and that imposes conditions and time limitations on the protection that is granted. Authorization is also impractical, imposing costs, delays, publicity and uncertainty in circumstances in which such imposts are evidently unwarranted. More generally, it reduces self-reliance and independent decisionmaking.
113
The approach that has been taken in formulating the new cartel offences and civil per se ruled that where the same statutory language is used for both criminal and civil prohibitions, the same interpretation must be adopted in both contexts.
119
The disquiet caused by the scope of the new prohibitions has been heightened by the approach taken to formulation of the new joint venture exception. 165 , where the High Court held that where the same wording is used for the purposes of criminal and civil proscription, the same interpretation must be adopted in both contexts (the legislature cannot be taken to have spoken 'with a forked tongue'). 120 See proposed TP Act, ss 44ZZRO, 44ZRP. 121 See TP Act, s 76C. DRAFT 090609 this confinement was necessary to prevent firms from escaping liability through the construction of sham joint ventures. 122 However, of equal concern is that it exposes to liability (criminal and civil) firms that make an arrangement or arrive at an understanding that contains a cartel provision or give effect to a cartel provision in the negotiation or implementation of a legitimate joint venture. 123 Limited also to joint venture activity involving production or supply, the exception excludes joint ventures that exclusively involve acquisition, marketing or research and development activity.
124
The limitations on the joint venture exception have few, if any, justifications on policy or practical grounds. But they are consistent with a tradition of overreach in the Australian formulation of cartel prohibitions. They are also consistent with a prescriptive black-letter law style of statutory drafting that reflects a rule-based rather than a principle-based approach to regulation. 125 This approach in turn reflects shallow faith in the judiciary's capacity to distinguish between conduct that the legislature intended to be banned from conduct that is 'innocent' from a competition perspective. The effect of this drafting style is that parties and judges often focus more on logicchopping interpretive parsing and analysis of the words of the statute than on the fundamental purposes and concepts underlying the legislation. 130 The result is a wordbased rather than a transaction-or outcome-based approach to application of the to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of the product; or (c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of the product. The offence is subject to a defense of ancillary restraint under s 45(4). 130 133 This phrase has given rise to questions as to whose 'purpose' is relevant to establish breach of the prohibition -whether it is the purpose of all of the parties to a contract, arrangement or understanding or merely the purpose of some parties, such as the party or parties responsible for including the provision in the contract, arrangement or understanding, as well as whether the purpose is subjectively or objectively ascertainable. See 135 This phrase has given rise to questions such as whether the relevant exclusionary purpose has to be the immediate purpose of the parties or their ultimate purpose and how that purpose is to be ascertained (ie whether it may or should be derived from focussing on the provision in question or whether the wider context or circumstances of the overall transaction should be taken into account DRAFT 090609 uncertainty will extend also to those charged with applying the law -judges and, in the context of the cartel offences, juries. Evidently, little thought was given by the drafters to the formidable challenge that will arise in preparing comprehensible jury directions.
144
Even if that challenge is met, as one commentator has foreshadowed (tongue in cheek), there is 'a high possibility that … the foreman of a jury in a cartel-related criminal trial may well declare a not-guilty verdict with the additional comment to the court that the jury so found because it could not understand the law under which the accused was tried'. The second consequence of excessively prescriptive drafting is that unexpected errors are made and arbitrary loopholes created. For example, the definition of an output restricting cartel provision under the CC&OM Bill covers restrictions in supply, production and capacity, but not in acquisition. 148 The drafting of the exception for joint ventures under the Bill requires that the cartel provision be 'for the purposes of a joint venture'.
However, as Fisse has pointed out, 'there is no explicit requirement that the provision be for the "sole or dominant purposes" of a joint venture. This laxity opens the way for competitors to create "Mickey Mouse" joint venture arrangements in order to avoid the per se prohibitions against cartel conduct.' 149
Enforcement bifurcation and excessive discretion
The Australian debate over criminalization has been as much concerned with how the new law will be enforced as it has with its scope and drafting. Indeed, the two concerns are inextricably linked. The breadth of the proposed prohibitions as drafted brings to the fore questions about which agencies will decide to prosecute conduct as offences rather than civil contraventions and on what criteria such decisions will be based in practice.
Enforcement agency roles and relationship
As pointed out in section 2 above, responsibility for enforcement of Australia's new cartel regime will be divided between two agencies -assigning investigation, instigation of civil proceedings and referral for prosecution to the ACCC, and prosecution, including both the decision to prosecute and the carriage of the prosecution, to the DPP. This is to be compared with an integrated model in which the same agency performs both investigatory and prosecutorial functions and makes all of the relevant decisions pertaining to these functions, best exemplified by the United States' Department of Justice Antitrust
Division. The bifurcated enforcement model reflects the value attributed to independence (including independence from the political process) and consistency in prosecutorial decision-making across the full spectrum of federal criminal offences in Australia. 151 In the regulatory context, in Australia separation of the investigatory and prosecutorial functions is seen as having the benefit of utilizing the domain-specific expertise and experience of a regulator in investigating potential offences, while retaining independence and consistency in the ultimate decision to prosecute by assigning this responsibility to the centralized stand-alone prosecutions agency.
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At the same time there is potential for inefficiency, at best, and conflict generating suboptimal outcomes, at worst, as a result of having two agencies with traditionally divergent cultures, priorities and perspectives involved in enforcement. Self-evidently, the model does not embrace separation of investigatory and prosecutorial functions as a mechanism for promoting impartiality and fairness in the criminal justice system. It also true to say that the extent of largely unchecked prosecutorial discretion in the United States, relating to who will be charged, the crimes with which they will be charged and to a significant degree the punishment to which they will be subject, has attracted substantial criticism: see has been said to work smoothly. 155 In particular, it appears that while the DPP retains ultimate independence in decision-making, there is a high degree of consultation with the Bureau throughout the enforcement process, including in the critical areas of immunity policy, settlement or plea bargaining pursuant to cooperation (or leniency as it is referred to in Canada) policy and sentencing.
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In the Australian context, there is precedent for cooperation between the ACCC and the DPP in relation to the consumer protection provisions of the TP Act, the breach of some of which carries criminal penalties, 157 as well as in relation to offences associated with obstruction of investigations. 158 However, criminal prosecutions in these areas have been rare 159 and hence it is true to say that with the introduction of the criminal cartel regime, the ACCC and DPP are entering substantially uncharted territory. Certainly, cartel cases are likely to be more complex and challenging than any others on which the two agencies have worked together previously. There has been some acknowledgement of this in joint appearances and public statements by ACCC and DPP representatives in recent months. 160 Every effort is being made to present a united front. There was no public evidence of such joint advancement -not surprisingly, perhaps, given it is not the DPP' policy to speak publicly on such issues. It must be assumed therefore that the advancement referred to was undertaken privately in consultation with Treasury and the Minister. 161 This was particularly so in connection with the decision to drop criminal charges for obstruction of an ACCC investigation into the Visy/Amcor cartel against Richard Pratt in the days before his death, generating substantial criticism directed largely at the ACCC for deciding to refer the matter for prosecution in the first place having previously settled the civil cartel case against Visy. See 'Watchdog DRAFT 090609
The historically fractured and tense relationship between the Australian corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and the DPP is evidence of how the separation of roles, absent a positive intra-agency working relationship, can undermine enforcement efforts. 162 For example, it has been reported that ASIC has been frustrated by the number of cases rejected for trial by the DPP. 163 At the same time, ASIC has been criticized for not bringing enough criminal proceedings generally, 164 as well as for failing to refer matters to the DPP for criminal charges in previous high profile cases, the most well known of which is the case involving Australian celebrity figure and businessman, Steve Vizard. 165 ASIC's handling of the Vizard case led to an unseemly public spat between the corporate regulator and the DPP. 166 That controversy led to a revised Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies in an attempt to avoid recurrence of such episodes in the future. 167 DRAFT 090609
The only publicly available enforcement guidelines relating to the cartel regime to date are those contained in the ACCC/DPP MOU which, for the reasons outlined below, provide limited guidance. should not be predicted that things will go wrong in the relationship, the ASIC/DPP
experience indicates that such eventualities should be provided for so as to facilitate the smooth and expeditious resolution of disputes if and when they arise.
Enforcement decision-making
The scheme of overreaching parallel criminal and civil prohibitions to be introduced by the CC & OM Bill has the consequence that significant power is vested in the ACCC and DPP to determine when to pursue a matter as a potential offence and when otherwise to deal with it as a potential civil violation. To date, the only guidance on how such determinations will be made in the specific context of cartel conduct is in the ACCC/DPP MOU. 171 Reflective of Australian distrust of administrative power generally, 172 the MOU has been criticized for failing to provide adequate guidance on how the ACCC and DPP In relation to the topics that it does purport to cover, the information provided in the ACCC/DPP MOU is incomplete or unclear. There is scant guidance offered, for example, on the approach taken by the ACCC in deciding whether to launch a criminal investigation. The important related question of how evidence collection for a civil proceeding may affect a potential criminal investigation or prosecution receives minimal treatment. 177 Detailed guidelines on criminal investigations appear to have been anticipated but, as yet, there is no sign that they have been or are being prepared.
178 173 In response to such concerns, the ACCC has pointed to safeguards against a miscarriage in its discretion, including the independent assessment of the DPP, the committal process and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that will lay heavily on the prosecution to establish its case before a jury. However, the existence of such safeguards will be of little comfort to a defendant who has been unjustifiably subjected to the disruption, stress and stigma associated with a criminal investigation, even less having been publicly charged on indictable offences and subjected to a committal proceeding or, worse, trial. 174 The criteria identified in the ACCC/DPP MOU as relevant to the ACCC's decision to refer a matter for prosecution and the DPP's decision to prosecute (duration and extent of the conduct, effects on the market and the public, and prior similar conduct) are expressed at the highest level of generality. 179 A virtually meaningless threshold of more than AU$1 million value of affected commerce has been set. 180 There are additional criteria contained in other policy documents (including in the ACCC's general Compliance and Enforcement Policy and the DPP's general Prosecution Policy). 181 It is unclear how the various criteria in these policy documents are intended to interact with each other. While the ACCC/DPP MOU indicates that all such criteria will be relevant, no attempt is made to order or prioritize them in any way. these agencies and foreign enforcement authorities; 184 the approach that will be taken to bail and in particular the extent to which the DPP might consult with and consider the ACCC's views on this matter; 185 the circumstances, if any, where a prosecution will be brought for the offence of conspiracy to commit a cartel offence, conspiracy to defraud a Commonwealth entity, 186 the offence of money laundering, or an offence of obstruction of justice either instead of a cartel offence or together with a cartel offence. 187 On a more positive note, a major concern raised early in the debate concerning reconciliation of the DPP's approach to immunity from prosecution with the ACCC's approach has been addressed. Based on the hallmark traits of maximum certainty and minimum discretion, the ACCC Immunity Policy is designed to meet the particular challenges of detecting and proceeding against cartel conduct consistent with the approach taken by antitrust enforcers around the world. 188 By contrast, reflecting maximum discretion and minimum certainty consistent with a traditional prosecutorial approach, the DPP's general policy in determining when to prosecute is to assess whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and if so whether it is in the overall public interest to prosecute (or not prosecute as the case may be).
189
Recognising the difficulties that application of the DPP's policy would pose for immunity in the cartel context in circumstances where the DPP is the final decision-maker on such matters, the ACCC/DPP MOU provides for the ACCC to receive and manage requests for immunity from both criminal and civil proceedings, and make recommendations to the DPP based on the ACCC's assessment as to whether the applicant for immunity meets the criteria set out in the ACCC's Immunity Policy in relation to cartel conduct. 190 The DPP will then make an independent assessment and decide whether to grant immunity from criminal proceedings in accordance with its general policy. Significantly, however, an
Annexure has been added to that policy which makes it clear that, in making that decision, the DPP will apply the same conditions as apply under the ACCC Immunity Policy and that the DPP's decision will be communicated to the applicant at the same time as the ACCC's decision on civil immunity. 191 This is the first occasion on which the DPP's Prosecution Policy has been revised in such a substantive way to accommodate 'special' concerns arising in connection with a particular offence. It was a significant concession on the part of the DPP, and would have been a confidence-booster for the ACCC and a source of relief to the Minister, meaning one less controversy of the many that he has confronted in the criminalization debate to date.
That said, the question of how defendants who are not eligible for immunity but nevertheless wish to cooperate will be dealt with remains unresolved. The ACCC has a general Cooperation Policy for Enforcement Matters under which it negotiates with cooperating defendants. 192 Particularly under its current Chairman, the ACCC has demonstrated a preference for settlement over contested litigation, 193 and a large proportion of cartel cases have been resolved in this way, even if at the expense of higher penalties and the precedential value that might flow from greater judicial input on matters of both liability and penalty assessment. In return for cooperation under the policy, the DRAFT 090609 ACCC offers a range of incentives, the most common of which involves preparation of an agreed statement of facts that is tightly drafted in such a way as to minimise admissions that might encourage private follow-on actions for damages, 194 and a submission on penalties that are jointly presented to the court and invariably receive judicial endorsement. 195 This approach is far removed from the DPP's approach to charge negotiations, as they are called under the DPP's Prosecution Policy. 196 In Australia, there is no direct counterpart to the structured process of plea bargaining that exists in United States. 197 The phrase, 'plea bargaining', as used in the United States to reflect an exchange of concessions leading to an outcome based on bargaining rather than the merits, is avoided in Australia. 198 In Australia, by contrast, plea discussions are described as 'an informal, semi-adversarial, semi-co-operative process which attempts, in a situation of uncertainty, to identify the facts which can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the charge which most appropriately reflects the facts, to the satisfaction of both the prosecution and defence'. 199 Furthermore, in the United States, discussions between the prosecution and defence often involve the judge and judges rarely reject the prosecutor's recommendations as to sentence. In Australia, there is no judicial involvement in the content of plea discussions in Australia and the judge is not bound in any way to accept counsel's recommendations as to sentence. 200 There are also no sentencing guidelines DRAFT 090609
Conclusion
As a matter of general policy or principle there appears to be a growing international consensus that cartel conduct warrants criminal sanctions. However, as borne out by the Australian experience, the process by which a country decides to criminalize and the issues that arise in the design of a criminal cartel regime are far less likely to be generalizable or, for that matter, transferable amongst jurisdictions. In short, there are likely to be many different strains of the criminalization contagion.
In Australia the challenges involved in criminalization have been as much political as degree of trepidation about further empowering the ACCC, seen by some as being too powerful already and as overzealous or dogmatic in the exercise of its power. 210 At the same time, rather than being viewed as a restraining influence, the introduction of the DPP, an agency unknown and inaccessible to most in competition law circles, has only sharpened the nerves. 211 The criticisms are also in large part a function of long-standing discontent with the approach taken to Australian competition legislation generally. The over-inclusive and simultaneously highly prescriptive and complex formulation of the new prohibitions is symptomatic of the approach taken in relation to many of the prohibitions under the TP Act. In the past it has attracted criticism for creating undue uncertainty for business as well as diverting the attention of adjudicators from applying a purposive and principled approach to statutory interpretation. In the present context, not unexpectedly, those concerns have been heightened given the consequences for individuals prosecuted under the regime, as well as for business and the Australian economy generally. That the new provisions will need to be understood and applied by juries has been an added cause for concern.
There is no doubt that the Australian embrace of criminalization will have flow-on effects for the international movement. Already there are signs of its spread, New Zealand having indicated that it will observe the Australian experience carefully with a view to following suit. 212 However, once a country embarks on the path of examining closely how to accommodate a criminal cartel regime within its existing legislative framework and enforcement institutions, it should quickly become evident that there is no off-the- DRAFT 090609 shelf 'model' available for adoption. 213 Each jurisdiction will need to navigate the particular political, social, economic and legal challenges involved in deciding to criminalize and, conceivably to an even greater extent, in designing the law and policy that will implement the decision. In each case, depending on how those challenges are met by political leaders and policy-makers, the outcome is likely to be different.
In Australia's case, despite strong broad-based support for competition policy as well as, it may seem, for the basic idea that cartels should attract criminal sanctions, 214 the process of formulating the new regime has been divisive and the outcome has few public supporters outside of the ACCC. It is difficult to assess what this is likely to mean for the credibility of the criminalization reform going forward. It is conceivable that once the law is enacted, the criticism will dissipate as stakeholders become resigned to dealing with it as best they can. Just as plausibly, the criticism could intensify as the practical reality of the new regime is exposed. One possibility is that the business sector, rather than becoming more compliant, becomes more resistant and actively explores ways in which to avoid the application of the new legislation. 215 However, what is clear is that the approach taken by the ACCC and DPP to authorizations, investigations and prosecutions will be scrutinized closely and that in the courtroom of public opinion, there will be little criminalize is under consideration. This is to be contrasted with a sequential approach in which the general decision whether to criminalize is determined first and if decided in the affirmative, then consideration of questions as to the conduct to be made an offence and the institutional responsibility for, policy and mode of enforcement follow. 216 Depending on the country's particular legal and institutional framework, such questions may include:
• what should be the elements of a cartel offence, physical and mental, bearing in mind the objective of criminalizing only 'serious' cartel conduct, as well as the practical constraints of trying such an offence before a jury;
• how would a cartel offence relate to existing civil prohibitions and, in particular, to what extent should it be differentiated on the basis of capturing a narrower and/or different category of conduct;
• what would be appropriate exemptions and defenses for a cartel offence and how should these relate to or be differentiated from exemptions and defenses for civil prohibitions;
• • what protection would be available from double jeopardy if the cartel offence applies to substantially the same conduct as the civil prohibitions;
• which agencies would be involved in enforcement of the cartel offence and, if more than one, what would be the roles and relationship between them;
• what would be the implications for policies that are seen as crucial to anti-cartel law enforcement, such as immunity/leniency policy; 216 The sequential approach was adopted by Australia, and continues to be advocated by the Australian agencies in international fora: see DRAFT 090609
• what would be the appropriate degree of discretion given to enforcement agencies in determining which conduct to prosecute and how should discretion be structured or confined; and
• what approach would be taken to sentencing and are sentencing guidelines likely to be required.
Any decision to criminalize without considering, at least in a general sense, the questions identified above, inevitably will be a decision driven primarily by politics (that of the government, as well as the regulator, and conceivably the power struggle between them), rather than by an in-depth and informed assessment of the legal and practical implications of criminalization.
The second lesson is that criminalization requires strong political leadership, together with clear public support from the competition enforcement agency. However, even if these preconditions are met, the challenges in terms of the number, complexity and potentially controversial nature of issues involved are likely to be great. Hence, there are likely to be substantial benefits in referring the matter for examination initially by an independent body that has the expertise and capacity to deal with it thoroughly, openly and sensitively. In Australia, such a body would have been the Australian Law Reform Commission. Instead criminalization was dealt with superficially by the Dawson Committee and then handballed to the government which anointed a cartel-like working party, the procedures and findings of which remain secret to this day.
The process conducted by such a body should include, at a minimum, the production and release of a discussion paper raising the issues identified above for consideration, the receipt and publication of submissions, followed by the publication of a comprehensive report with recommendations. The government should respond publicly and in detail to the report and its recommendations. Whether further consultation is required at that stage would depend on the response by stakeholders to the process and the extent to which the recommendations and/or the government's response are qualified or ambiguous in any significant respect. There may well be a case for releasing an exposure draft of the legislation to allow for further reflection with the benefit of having the regime in its proposed statutory form.
If these two lessons are learnt from the Australian experience, the chances are that the criminalization decision will be more informed, the legislative process smoother, the
